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In this paper we construct a model in which entrepreneurial innovations are
sold into oligopolistic industries and where adverse selection problems between en-
trepreneurs, venture capitalists and incumbents are present. We show that as ex-
acerbated development by better-informed venture-backed rms is used as a signal
to enhance the sale price of developed innovations, venture capitalists must be suf-
ciently more ecient in selecting innovative projects than incumbents in order to
exist in equilibrium. Otherwise, incumbents undertake early preemptive, acquisi-
tions to prevent the venture-backed rms' signaling-driven investment, despite the
risk of buying a bad innovation. We nally show at what point the presence of
active venture capitalists increases the incentives for entrepreneurial innovations.
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11 Introduction
Entrepreneurs possessing early stage innovations that need development to be commer-
cially viable in oligopolistic markets have two main options. The entrepreneur may either
sell the early stage innovation directly to an incumbent or seek nancial support from an
independent actor, such as a venture capitalist. Typically there are large informational
problems associated with assessing the value of an undeveloped innovation, thus the abil-
ity to evaluate it will likely vary between dierent actors, such as incumbents and venture
capitalists. The purpose of this paper is to examine how these information asymmetries
determine the ownership and development patterns of innovations that will be used in
oligopolistic markets.
To this end we develop a model with the following features: There is a product-market
which is served by several incumbent oligopolists. There is also an entrepreneur possessing
an early stage innovation that needs development in order to be commercially viable in
that market. The entrepreneur cannot personally develop the early stage innovation but
instead may sell it to one of the incumbents or, alternatively, seek support from one of
several venture capitalists.
We assume that the innovation may be good or bad for development. In particu-
lar, we assume that if it is good, investment in its development increases the acquiring
rm's product-market prot and decreases the prots of the non-acquiring rivals. On
the other hand, if the nature of the innovation is bad, its development has no eect on
product-market prots. We assume the nature of the idea to be the entrepreneur's private
information.
As the investment in development has an impact on product-market prots only as
long as the innovation is good, and as investment in bad ideas is assumed to be costly for
a venture-backed rm, the size of the investment in development may serve as a signal1 of
the innovation's type to potential late-stage acquirers. We assume that after development
the venture-backed rm's exit takes place by means of a sale to an incumbent rm.2 3
1Technology journals provide evidence that rms in high-tech industries indeed use technology proxies
such as the number of R&D personnel to signal the value of their rms to investors. See [36] Megginson,
Wang, and Chua, (2001) and references to articles in technology journals therein.
2For instance, [10] Cochrane (2005) uses data over the period 1987 to June 2000 from the VentureOne
database and shows that 20% of the ventures were acquired, 21% were IPOs, 9% went out of business,
while 49% remained private. [12] Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) found similar gures.
3[22] Granstrand and Sj olander (1990) and [23] Hall et al. (1990) present evidence, from Sweden and
2Finally, we assume that the acquirer and the non-acquiring incumbents compete in the
product market.
We rst show that when venture-backed rms are better informed they have an in-
centive to a large investment to signal the high quality of the innovation to be sold to
the incumbents, since this increases the sale price of the developed innovation.
We next turn to the issue of whether the incumbents benet from waiting for the
venture-backed rm's signaling. Prima facie, it seems reasonable to believe that the
incumbents would prefer to allow a better informed venture capitalist signal the quality of
an innovation prior to acquiring it. However, due to the interaction between informational
and oligopolistic externalities, this comes at a cost. Indeed, we show that if the venture
capitalists' informational advantage is not too large, it is optimal for the incumbents not
to wait but rather to use a preemptive acquisition. Key to understanding this result
is to see how the signal aects the acquisition price of the developed innovation in an
oligopolistic setting. In equilibrium, the acquisition price of the developed innovation is
shown to equal an incumbent rm's valuation of obtaining it which, in turn, consists of
the dierence between the rm's prot if it obtains the developed innovation and its prot
if the innovation is obtained by a rival rm. Therefore, the signal through investment in
development amplies the acquisition price by more than the increase in the acquirer's
prot; the increase in the acquisition price also reects the investment's negative impact
on the non-acquirer's prot. Thus, acquiring a developed innovation from a venture
capitalist may be very costly.
We then show that only if venture-backed rms are suciently better informed than
the incumbents regarding the prospect of the innovation and if the cost of mimicking
a good idea is suciently high, the incumbents wait and let a more informed venture
capitalist develop an innovation before acquiring it. Consequently, to exist in equilib-
rium, venture capitalists must be suciently more ecient in selecting good ideas than
incumbent rms.
We nally show that unless venture capitalists are very inecient in their signaling,
the existence of a venture capital market increases the expected payo entrepreneurs that
receive from engaging in early stage innovative activity. This is true even if the innovation
from the US, respectively, that rms acquire innovative targets to gain access to their technologies. In
the biotech industry, [35] Lerner and Merges (1998) note that acquisitions are important for know-how
transfers. [38] OECD (2002) argues that established rms often acquire rms to access new technologies.
3is preemptively acquired by an incumbent rm.
Our paper relates to several strands of the economics literature. In the literature
that describes the role played by venture capitalists in the innovation process, venture
capitalists have been identied to be good at solving moral hazard problems4, to be
providing managerial value added5, as well as to be exploiting strategic product-market
eects.6 We add to this literature by examining how information asymmetries determine
both the ownership of innovations and their development patterns within the innovation
industry. By focussing on the implications of the venture capitalists' ability to select good
ideas, we relate to recent theoretical papers that study the pre-investment selection and
contracting process.7 However, the focus of these papers is on the design of the selection
process rather than its impact on the post-selection involvement of the venture capitalists
which are characterized by signaling and oligopolistic eects which, by contrast, are the
key elements of our paper.
The paper is also related to the literature that studies how product-market eects
inuence the pattern of independent and incumbent-based development of innovations8
and which shows that early sales or licensing are more likely when property rights are
more secure. Our paper's contribution to this literature is to allow for competitive bidding
among the oligopolistic incumbents over the innovation as well as to allow for signaling.
This enables us to show that early sales are more likely in cases where the venture
capitalists are less ecient in selecting innovation projects relative to incumbents; where
those innovations have a high ex-ante potential; and where the cost of mimicking a good
innovation is small.
A crucial feature of the models in the signaling literature,9 which we share, is that
a seller of a good uses some device to signal the quality of the good. We add to this
literature by focusing on a productive signal, i.e., a signal that aects the productivity of
the asset (good) that is sold post-signaling in the ensuing product-market interaction.10
4See for instance [6] Casamatta (2003), [25] Hellmann (2006), [27] Inderst and Mueller (2004), [30]
Kaplan and Str omberg (2001), [32] Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2004), [39] Repullo and Suarez (2004), and
[43] Schmidt (2003).
5See for instance [29] Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003).
6See [37] Norb ack and Persson (forthcoming).
7See, for example, [7] Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007), [8] Cestone, Lerner, and White (2007),
[11] Cumming and Johan (2008), or [33] Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2006).
8See [2] Anton and Yao (1994), [19], [20] Gans and Stern (2000, 2003), and [24] Hellmann (2002).
9See, for instance, [40] Riley (2001) for an overview.
10An exemption is [4] Ben-Shahar (2004) who allows for productive signaling in a real estate setting.
4Moreover, we add to the signaling literature by endogenously determining whether the
ability to signal will be used in equilibrium. In our model, in order to exist in equilibrium,
the sender (the venture-backed rm) must be suciently better informed (more ecient in
the selection of innovations) than the receivers (incumbent rms); otherwise, the receivers
(incumbents) will block the signaling through a preemptive acquisition of the early stage
innovation.
Finally, by explaining the role that information asymmetries play in the determination
of the mode of nancing for an innovation, we contribute to the literature regarding how
dierent institutional settings, such as the presence of a venture capital market, may
aect the incentives for entrepreneurial innovations in an oligopolistic environment. We
thus also add novel insights to the literature on entrepreneurship.1112
The model is spelled out in section 2. In section 3, we explore how the incentives to
develop early stage innovations dier between venture-backed and incumbent rms when
asymmetric information problems are present. In section 4, the equilibrium ownership of
early stage innovations and incentives for early stage research are discussed. We illustrate
our model with a specic example in section 5 and in section 6 we explore the eects of
relaxing some of the assumptions made. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider the model summarized in the timing in gure 1, where an industry is served by
a set I = f1;2;::;i;:::;NIg of ex-ante symmetric oligopolistic incumbents.
In stage 0, an entrepreneur, denoted E, invests in a costly research eort e that could
However, in that paper, no product market eects are present, and no preemptive acquisitions are
possible, both of which are crucial to our results.
11For overviews, see [1] Acs and Audretsch (2005) and [5] Bianchi and Henrekson (2005). [3] Baumol
(2004) stresses the importance of the dierent roles played by small entrepreneurial rms and large es-
tablished rms in the innovation process in the US, where small entrepreneurial rms create a large share
of breakthrough innovations and large established rms provide more routinized R&D. To our knowledge
very few papers in this literature incorporate oligopolistic eects. An exception is [16] Gabszewicz and
Laussel (2007) which proposes a bilateral oligopoly model to study how wealth aects whether individuals
choose to become entrepreneurs.
12This paper is also pertinent to the literature in the area of patent licensing, where a license is sold at
an auction and the potential buyers are competing in a downstream market. See [31] Katz and Shapiro
(1986) or, for an overview, [28] Kamien (1992). However, in the patent licensing literature, the size of
the investment in the licensed asset aects neither the information set nor the technological set for the
acquirer. Instead, in our paper the size of the investment is determined endogenously as a function of
both the information asymmetries inherent in the licensing process and the technological implications
for the licensee.
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Figure 1: The timing of the game.
lead to the creation of a unique asset which we refer to as an early stage innovation. The
early stage innovation requires costly additional development for commercial use. We
assume that the entrepreneur lacks the nancial means to develop the innovation himself.
We consider two types of innovations, good and bad ones. We denote an innovation's
type with  2 fg;bg, where g stands for good and b for bad. For a good innovation,
a costly investment leads to a successful development for commercialized use. A bad
one will never be commercially successful, irrespective of the level of investment in its
development. We assume that whether the innovation is good or bad is the entrepreneur's
private information. It is not veriable by a court at any point in time and therefore is
not contractible. Instead, any investment made in its development is costlessly veriable.
In stage 1, the entrepreneur may either sell it to one of the incumbents in the industry
or, alternatively, seek support from one of the venture capitalists. We assume there to
be a set J = f1;2;::;j;::;NJg of symmetric venture capitalists who compete to provide
expertise and nancial support to the entrepreneur in return for equity holdings in a
venture-backed rm founded together with the entrepreneur. We model the decision of
whether to sell to an incumbent or to found a venture-backed rm as a rst-price sealed-
bid auction in which the ex-ante symmetric oligopolists and the venture capitalists bid for
appropriating the early stage innovation. We assume that venture capitalists are perfectly
informed about the innovation's quality, whereas incumbents assign a probability  2
]0;1[ to the event that the innovation is good and 1  to the event that it is bad.13 This
prior is common knowledge. It is only after obtaining an innovation that an incumbent
can inform himself perfectly regarding its nature. We show below that venture capitalists





is the probability that the signal is correct and q is the prior probability that an
innovation is good, and if we dene  =
aq
aq+(1 a)(1 q), then  would carry information about the degree
of asymmetric information between incumbents and venture capitalists, a. If the innovation is good, the
higher the , the lower is the asymmetry of information; if the innovation is bad, the higher is the , the
higher is the degree of asymmetry of information.
6must be suciently better informed to be active in equilibrium and thus that our results
do not crucially depend on the assumption that venture capitalists are better informed.14
If an incumbent rm obtains the innovation in stage 1, the acquiring rm invests in
its development in stage 2. If the entrepreneur obtains nancing and support from a
venture capitalist in stage 1, the venture-backed rm then invests in the development
of the innovation in stage 2. We assume the investments to be costlessly veriable and
irreversible. We also assume the development of an innovation to be equally costly for
both the incumbents and a venture-backed rm. Venture-backed rms, however, incur
an extra cost if they develop a bad innovation. This represents the value of the venture
capitalists' reputation, which is potentially lost; or the extra cost incurred for building up
a convincing Potemkin village if they invest in bad innovations. In particular, we dene
the incumbents' development cost function as
Ci (kj) = C (k);





C (k) + (k)
for  = g;
for  = b:
Assume these investment cost functions to have the following properties:
Assumption 1 C (0) = (0) = 0, C0(k) > 0, 0 (k) > 0:
In stage 3, upon development, the venture-backed rm j exits by selling the developed
innovation by means of a perfect information rst-price sealed-bid auction, to one of the
incumbent rms. We denote the sale price of this late stage, developed, innovation in
stage 3 by S3, whereas we denote the sale price of the early stage, undeveloped, innovation
in stage 1 by S1.
Finally, in stage 4, the incumbent rms compete in oligopoly interaction, setting
an action xi, taking into account the chosen investment level.15 This action may be
14It should be noted that if both venture capitalists and incumbents are not perfectly informed, the
analysis, e.g., the auction game in period 1, becomes much more involved. We expect our main mech-
anisms also to be present in such an environment. A careful analysis of that case is, however, left to
future research.
15In the degenerate case where  = 1, it is shown in [37] Norb ack and Persson (forthcoming) that
the acquiring rm will never invest sequentially in equilibrium. As this result would carry over to our
model setup, we do not lose generality by assuming that the acquiring oligopolist will not add to the
venture capitalist's investment before entering the product-market competition. We gain, however, in
the simplicity of our exposition.
7considered as (a combination of) setting a price, setting a quantity, and/or engaging in
advertising, etc. We assume that, prior to their product-market interaction, the nature
of the innovation is revealed to all incumbents.16
3 Incentives to develop
In this section, we will show how the incentives to develop an innovation dier between
venture-backed and incumbent rms. Solving the game backwards, we start with the
product-market equilibrium. For the case in which a venture-backed rm has been
founded in stage 1, we then determine the sale price S3 in stage 3 and the venture-backed
rm's optimal investment decision in stage 2 in a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
where venture-backed rms signal the nature of the innovation through their investment
choice. For the case of a preemptive early acquisition in stage 1, we instead solve for an
incumbent's optimal investment choice in stage 2.
3.1 Product-market equilibrium
In the product-market interaction, each rm i seeks to maximize its direct product-market
prot i(xi;x i;kj) by choosing an action xi 2 R+. In addition to its own choice xi,
its prot also depends on the vector of actions taken by rival incumbent rms, x i, the
amount of development undertaken, k, as well as the nature of the project, . Assume









 ) = 0; 8i 2 I; (1)
where x
i is rm i's equilibrium action and x
 i the vector of its rivals' equilibrium actions.
Using the ex-ante symmetry among incumbents, ex-post there are going to be two types
of rms: the acquiring rm, denoted A, and the non-acquiring rms, denoted N. We
denote by x
A the equilibrium action of the acquiring rm and by x
N the vector of the
equilibrium actions of the non-acquiring incumbent rms. Note that the equilibrium
actions x
A and x
N only depend on k and . For this reason, we can directly dene the
equilibrium product-market prots RA of the acquirer and RN of the non-acquirers as
16Not taking this assumption complicates the analysis without altering the main insights.




RN(kj)  N (x
N (kj);x
A (kj)): (2)
We denote these reduced form product-market prots by RA and RN, respectively, as
they have revenue character in the investment stage of the game. We assume them to
have the following properties:
Assumption 2 The equilibrium product-market prots RA (kj) and RN (kj) satisfy














This assumption stipulates (1) if a good innovation does not receive investment in
its development, or if an innovation is bad for development, this does not aect the
product-market prots. It species (2) that the equilibrium product-market prot of the
acquirer of a good innovation is strictly increasing in the investments in the innovation's
development, whereas such investments strictly decrease the rivals' prots; and that the
eect of a bad innovation on the product-market is nil, irrespective of the amount of
investment in its development.18
3.2 Sale of the developed innovation by the venture-backed rm
After having solved for the product-market equilibrium, we now turn to stage 3, the sale
of a developed innovation by a venture-backed rm. Note that stage 3 is only reached
if in stage 1 there was no preemptive acquisition, i.e., if a venture-backed rm has been
established in stage 1. As mentioned, we will solve for a separating perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which a venture-backed rm signals the type of innovation in its possession.
In our model, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of a set of strategies and a belief
function, giving the incumbents' common probability assessment that the innovation on
17To save space, we write the arguments in RN(kj)  N(x
N (kj);x
A (kj)) with a slight abuse








18To keep the exposition simple, we do not formulate this as an assumption on the primitives of the




dk , keeping in
mind that these summarize the total eects on the product-market prots. This assumption holds, e.g.,
in the Linear-Quadratic Cournot model which is presented in section 5 but is also compatible with other
oligopoly models such as that of [15] Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
9sale by a venture-backed rm is good after observing the chosen investment level, such
that (i) the venture-backed rm's strategy is optimal given the incumbents' strategies;
(ii) the beliefs are derived from the venture-backed rm's strategy using Bayes' rule where
possible; and (iii) the incumbents' bids following the observation of the venture-backed
rm's chosen investment level constitute a Nash equilibrium in the rst-price sealed-bid
auction where the probability that the innovation on sale is good is given by the beliefs
following this observation. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is separating if the venture-
backed rm's investment choice is dierent for the two types of innovations.
As in a separating equilibrium the type of the innovation is correctly inferred by the
bidding incumbent rms, it is appropriate to model the acquisition process in stage 3
as a perfect information rst-price sealed-bid auction with the NI incumbents as the
bidders and the venture-backed rm as the seller. After the bids have been announced,
the developed innovation is sold to one of the incumbents at the bid price.
In order to solve for the auction, we rst consider the incumbents' valuations, w, for
the developed innovation. For this purpose, dene w(kj) = RA (kj)   RN (kj), the
rst term of which shows the prot for an incumbent rm possessing the innovation and
the second term of which shows the prot of an incumbent if the innovation has been
obtained by a rival incumbent rm.
Let k
j () be the venture-backed rm's equilibrium investment choice as a function
of the type of innovation in its possession and S3 (k) the equilibrium sale price of the
developed innovation in stage 3 as a function of the venture-backed rm's investment
choice. We can then state the following:
Lemma 1 In any separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in stage 3, a good developed
innovation is acquired by an incumbent rm at a price equal to a rival incumbent rm's











; whereas a bad













Proof. See Appendix A.
In the separating equilibrium, the type of the innovation is correctly signaled to the
buyers. If the buyers infer from the venture-backed rm's investment decision that the
innovation is good, they have a valuation of w(kjg), which corresponds to the acquirer's
product-market prot less the prot an acquirer would receive from his outside option, i.e.,
10from competing as a non-acquirer. The equilibrium action in a perfect information rst-
price auction is to bid the second highest bidder's valuation, which { as all incumbents
are symmetric { equals the highest bidder's valuation. Thus, the sale price equals the
incumbents' valuation w(kjg). If they infer that the innovation is bad, the prots of an
acquirer and those of a non-acquirer are the same and thus w(kjb) = 0, which is also
the equilibrium bid.
3.3 Development of the innovation and signaling
Solving the game further backwards, we now turn to stage 2 where we determine the opti-
mal investment in the development of the innovation an acquiring incumbent (subsection
3.3.1) and a venture-backed rm (subsection 3.3.2) would choose.
3.3.1 The acquiring incumbent's optimal development
Assume rst that an incumbent preemptively acquired the innovation in stage 1. Af-
ter having acquired the innovation, all assets and documentation from the entrepreneur
become his property and the incumbent can perfectly inform himself regarding its nature.




there is nothing to be gained from investing in a bad project and it invests k
i (b) = 0.




i (g) = argmax
k
[RA (kjg)   C (k)]: (3)









Figures 2 and 3 depict this optimality condition in point A. From panels (i), it can be
seen that in this point, the marginal product-market prot
dRA(kjg)
dk equals the marginal
cost of investment C0 (k). In panels (ii) it can be seen that k
i (g) maximizes the acquiring
incumbent's prot RA (kjg)   C (k). We will turn to a description of the other parts of
these gures and comment upon them in subsection 3.3.2.
Lemma 2 summarizes our ndings.
Lemma 2 The acquiring incumbent's optimal investment in stage 2 is k
i (b) = 0 and
k
i (g) = argmax
k
















(ii) Net profits: 
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Figure 2: Incentives to develop innovations and net prots when the incentive compati-














(ii) Net profits: 
Signaling binding
(i) Investments in 
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Figure 3: Incentives to develop innovations and net prots when the incentive compati-
bility constraint is binding.
133.3.2 The venture backed rm's optimal development
Assume now that in stage 1, the entrepreneur teamed up with a venture capitalist to
develop the innovation within a venture-backed rm. As the exit of the venture capital
investment takes place through a sale in stage 3, the venture-backed rm chooses its
investment level kj such that it maximizes the sale price S3 (kj), derived in Lemma 1, net
of the cost of that investment. As we are solving for a separating equilibrium, we need
to determine an optimal investment choice for each type of innovation.
Consider the equilibrium investment level for the venture-backed rm owning a bad
innovation. As in a separating equilibrium, the bidding incumbents correctly infer the






= 0 (see Lemma 1); an investment kj > 0 does not increase the innovation's
value over that for kj = 0. Therefore, the following Lemma holds:
Lemma 3 In any separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, k
j (b) = 0.
Proof. See appendix B.
Using Lemmas 1 and 3, we can now construct the separating equilibrium. For this
purpose, rst note that assumption 1 implies that the isoprot curves of a venture-backed
rm possessing a bad innovation and those of one possessing a good innovation cross only
once in the S3 kj space, i.e., they fulll the single-crossing property. Using this property,
we can dene an incentive compatibility constraint (IC) that, if it holds, ensures that a
venture-backed rm possessing a bad innovation would not choose the investment level a
rm possessing a good innovation is choosing. Equilibrium investment levels k
j (g) and
k






































Using this incentive compatibility constraint and the single-crossing property of the
venture-backed rm's isoprot curves, we can dene the minimum investment level needed
by a venture-backed rm in order to signal the good type of its innovation to the incum-
bents. Dene this investment level with kc
j (g).19 We choose the superscript c as, if this
incentive compatibility constraint is binding, it will constrain the venture-backed rm in
its investment choice to this minimum investment level.
19That is, kc
















14For a visualization, once more consider gures 2 and 3, in particular panels (ii). In
these gures, any investment level larger than or equal to the one in point S0, in which
the dashed RA (kjg)   C (k)   (k) and the grey RN (kjg) lines intersect, is incentive
compatible, as for k  kc
j (g), S3 (k)   C (k)   (k) = RA (kjg)   C (k)   (k)  
RN (kjg)  0.
Given the incentive compatibility constraint, one consistent equilibrium belief of the
incumbents following an investment k is as follows: Incumbents assign a probability one
to the project being bad (and bid zero) if they observe k < kc
j (g) and they assign a
probability one to the project being good (and bid w(kjg)) if they observe k  kc
j (g).
Now that we have determined the conditions that k
j (g) must fulll we can solve for
its optimal level. For this purpose, note that investment in a good innovation increases
its sale price S3 as the incumbents' valuation of a good developed innovation in stage 3,
w(kjg), is an increasing function of k. Therefore, it is possible that, in equilibrium, the
incentive compatibility constraint is not binding and the venture-backed rm chooses k in
order to solve an unconstrained maximization program. Using Lemma 1, the maximizer
of this program, i.e., the unconstrained optimal investment of a venture-backed rm,
ku
j (g), is given by
k
u





[RA (kjg)   RN (kjg)   C (k)]:


























Once more, consider gures 2 and 3. Panels (i) depict how the unconstrained optimal
investment level ku











j (g)). Panels (ii) of these gures then examine whether this unconstrained optimal
investment level satises the incentive compatibility constraint. It holds for ku
j (g) in
Figure 2, but not in Figure 3.
If ku
j (g) is insucient to signal the good nature of the innovation, as in gure 3,
then the venture-backed rm needs to invest beyond this level in order to signal. As we
assumed RA (kjg) RN (kjg) C (k) to be strictly concave in k, a venture-backed rm's
prot beyond ku
j (g) is strictly decreasing. Therefore a venture-backed rm chooses the
15smallest investment level satisfying incentive compatibility, kc
j (g). Lemma 4 summarizes
this result.
Lemma 4 In the separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, k







While Lemma 3 showed that, in a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a venture
capitalist does not develop a bad early stage innovation, Lemma 4 demonstrates that it
develops good innovations as if there were no incentive compatibility problem as long
as the unconstrained optimally chosen level of development suces to signal. Good
innovations are developed beyond this level in order to signal the good nature of the
innovation. It follows from the construction of the incentive compatibility constraint that
an additional investment must be made whenever it is not suciently costly for a venture-
backed rm possessing a bad innovation to mimic one possessing a good innovation.
Proposition 1 summarizes our results so far.
Proposition 1 In a separating equilibrium, a venture-backed rm signals
(i) the bad nature of an idea by not investing anything in its interim development;
(iia) the good nature of an idea by investing as it would under full information as long
as it is suciently costly for a venture-backed rm to mimic the development of a good
innovation when it is bad; and
(iib) the good nature of an idea by investing more than it otherwise would under full
information.
Note that the optimal investment level of a venture-backed rm, k
j (g), is system-
atically higher than that of an incumbent rm, k
i (g). There are two reasons for that.
The rst comes from the product-market interaction of the acquiring and non-acquiring
incumbents: If (IC) is not binding, the venture-backed rm takes into account the posi-
tive impact of its investment on the prots of the acquirer,
dRA(kjg)
dk , but also the negative
impact on the non-acquirers' prots,
dRN(kjg)
dk . The second reason comes from the neces-
sity to signal. If (IC) is binding, the venture-backed rm has to invest beyond ku
j (g).
Therefore, we can state the following:
Proposition 2 For a good project, the optimal level of development by a venture-backed
rm which sells the developed innovation to an incumbent rm exceeds the optimal level
of development by the acquiring incumbent rm, i.e., k
j (g) > k
i (g).
16This proposition extends Norb ack and Persson (forthcoming) which states that venture-
backed rms would develop innovations to a larger extent than incumbents in order to
internalize the strategic product-market eects. In addition to this internalization eect,
in our framework, venture-backed rms choose even higher investment levels in order to
overcome the additional adverse selection problem.
4 The equilibrium ownership of early stage innova-
tions and incentives for early stage research
In this section, we use the results obtained for the separating equilibrium in order to de-
rive which parties develop innovations and, therefore, how extensively this development
will be pursued in equilibrium. To this end, we will rst derive the valuations of both
venture capitalists and incumbents, determine their equilibrium bids, and then charac-
terize ownership patterns. We conclude the section by pointing out implications for the
incentives to come up with early stage innovations.
4.1 Equilibrium ownership
The rst step in determining the equilibrium ownership and the acquisition price is to
derive the stage 1 valuations. In contrast to stage 3 valuations, which we denoted by w,
these stage 1 valuations will be denoted by v. Note that, as venture capitalists know the
nature of the innovation, we need to distinguish between valuations for good and bad
early stage innovations.
Consider a venture capitalist's valuation for a bad early stage innovation, which is
denoted as vj (b). As investing in a bad innovation does not result in an asset that can be
sold at a positive price,20 a venture capitalist has a valuation of zero for it, i.e., vj (b) = 0.
Now, consider a venture capitalist's valuation for a good early stage innovation, denoted
as vj (g). This is the sale price of the developed innovation in stage 3, net of the investment












20This is true as we are solving for the separating equilibrium. We will discuss this equilibrium choice
and, in particular, the reasons why we do not present pooling equilibria in detail in the conclusion.
17and thus the venture capitalist's valuation of the entrepreneur's early stage innovation is:


































In line with our earlier notation, we denote by vu
j (g) the venture capitalists' valuation
if the venture-backed rm is unconstrained in its choice of k, i.e., if its incentive com-
patibility constraint is not binding. Further, we denote by vc
j (g) the venture capitalists'
valuaton if the venture-backed rm is constrained in its choice of k, i.e., if its incentive
compatibility constraint is binding.
Let us turn to the valuation of the incumbents. Denote by vii the ex-ante expected
value for an incumbent rm of acquiring the early stage innovation when it would other-
wise be obtained and developed by a rival incumbent:
vii = [RA (k

i (g)jg)   C (k

i (g))   RN (k

i (g)jg)]: (7)
This is the dierence in the expected net prot of the acquirer,
[RA (k

i (g)jg)   C (k

i (g))] + (1   )RA (k

i (b)jb);
and the expected prot of the non-acquirer
RN (k

i (g)jg) + (1   )RA (k

i (b)jb);
evaluated at the acquiring incumbent's optimal development levels, k
i (). Note that
since vii is not a function of the level of investment chosen by the venture-backed rm, it
is independent of whether the venture-backed rm faces a constrained or an unconstrained
maximization problem when it chooses the level of investment in the development of the
innovation.
Compare vj (g) with vii. If the venture-backed rm's problem is unconstrained, the
investment choice is ku
j (g), which maximizes RA(kjg) C(k) RNA(kjg). Therefore, in
that case, vu
j (g) must exceed vii. This is illustrated in Figures 2 (ii) and 4 (ii). In Figure
2 (ii), vu
j (g) is shown as the vertical distance between V and V 0. In addition, the vertical
distance between A and A0 gives vii for  = 1. Figure 4 (ii) shows both valuations as
functions of . It demonstrates how for any  > 0, vii < vu
j (g).
If the venture-backed rm's incentive compatibility constraint holds with equality, a
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Figure 4: Equilibrium investment and ownership structure with a non-binding incentive
compatibility constraint.
19potential acquirers. This is reected in a lower { constrained maximized { prot from
the sale of the developed innovation and thus in a lower valuation for the early stage
innovation. Consider panel (ii) of gure 3. In this gure, the eect of a binding incentive
compatibility constraint on the venture capitalists' valuation is reected by a smaller
distance between S and S0, as compared to that between V and V 0. Now turn to gure 5
(ii). Here we show the eect of the incentive compatibility constraint by indicating vc
j (g),
which is smaller than vu
j (g).
In the situation where venture-backed rms incur a very small additional cost for
developing a bad idea, the minimum investment level needed to signal that the innovation
is good, kc
j (g), is high. This depresses the venture capitalists' valuation by a large
amount. If this situation coincides with a suciently high , which results in a relatively
high valuation by the incumbents, we may have vc
j (g) < vii. Denote the  for which
vc
j (g) = vii with ii. In Figure 6 (ii), which depicts this situation, there exists a ii such
that vii < vj (g) for  < ii and vii > vj (g) for  > ii. Lemma 5 summarizes this
nding.





suciently small, 9ii 2 ]0;1[, s.t. for  > ii, vii > vj (g)
and for  < ii, vii < vj (g):
Note that the preemptive acquisition of the early stage innovation by another incum-
bent rm is not the only alternative scenario an incumbent must consider when it is
bidding for it. The innovation could be obtained by a venture capitalist. Therefore, we
need to take into account the incumbent rms' expected value of obtaining the innovation





i (g)jg)   C(k
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Let us compare this valuation with vii. Recall from Lemma 2 that a venture-backed
rm develops a good innovation to a greater extent than an incumbent, i.e., k
j (g) >
k
i (g). This implies that a non-acquirer's prot if a venture capitalist obtains a good






, is lower than its prot if a competing incumbent
were to acquire it, RN (k
i (g)jg). Therefore, for all  2 ]0;1[, vii < vij: the ex-ante
expected value for an incumbent rm i of acquiring the early stage innovation, when it



















































































Figure 6: Equilibrium investment and ownership structure with a binding incentive com-
patibility constraint; for  > ii, vii > vc
j (g).
22value of obtaining the innovation when it would otherwise be obtained, developed, and
sold by a venture-backed rm j, vij.
Let us now compare vij with vj (g). Denote by vc
ij and vu
ij, respectively, the incumbent's
valuation if the venture-backed rm is constrained and unconstrained in its investment
choice by the necessity to signal.
Consider rst  ! 1 and assume that the venture-backed rm's incentive compatibil-
ity constraint is not binding. The valuation for this case, vu
ij, is shown in Figure 4 (ii).
As illustrated by the gure, for  ! 1, vu
ij > vu
j (g): an incumbent is willing to pay more
than a venture capitalist to obtain the innovation in order to avoid the overinvestment
by the venture capitalist. To see this, consider the dierence between these values for






















i (g) maximizes the acquiring incumbents' net prots RA(k)   C(k), and since
k
i (g) 6= ku
j (g), this dierence must be positive.
Still, consider  ! 1, but now assume that the venture-backed rm's incentive
compatibility constraint is binding. In this case, the venture-backed rm must invest
kc
j (g) > ku







> 0 for two reasons. First, due to the extra investment necessary
to signal, the incumbents' outside option in case of a binding incentive compatibility















ij. Second, as described earlier, this extra investment to signal is costly
for the venture-backed rm, thus, vc
j (g) < vu
j (g). This is illustrated in Figure 5 (ii).
Now consider  ! 0. In this case, irrespective of whether the venture-backed rm's
incentive compatibility constraint was binding, vij = 0 < vj (g). This is also illustrated
in Figure 5 (ii).
As for  ! 0, vij < vj (g) and for  ! 1, vij > vj (g), and as vij  vj (g) is continuous
and monotonously increasing in  2 ]0;1[, there must be a  2 ]0;1[ for which vij = vj (g).
Denote this  by PA. This notation anticipates that for  > PA preemptive acquisitions
of early stage innovations will occur. We summarize these intermediate results in Lemma
6.
Lemma 6 For all cost functions satisfying assumption 1, 9PA 2 ]0;1[, s.t. for  > PA,
vij > vj (g) and for  < PA, vij < vj (g).
23Using Lemmas 5 and 6, we can solve the rst-price sealed-bid auction in stage 1 in
order to derive the equilibrium ownership of the early stage innovation. Denote the sale
price of the early stage (undeveloped) innovation by S1.
First, note that bidding competition among the symmetric venture capitalists implies
that the equilibrium price of a good innovation cannot be lower than vj (g). Also, note
that even though there are several symmetric incumbents bidding for the innovation, they
will not bid up to vij. To see this, recall the two purposes of a preemptive acquisition
by an incumbent. The rst is to avoid another incumbent preemptively acquiring the
innovation, the value of which for an incumbent is vii. The second is to avoid a venture
capitalist acquiring, overdeveloping, and then selling the innovation at a high sale price,
the value of which to an incumbent is vij. We have shown that vii < vij. Therefore,
once one incumbent outbids the venture capitalists (by an "), no other incumbent has an
incentive to further outbid this incumbent.
Denoting the equilibrium sale price of the early stage (undeveloped) innovation with
S
1, it can be shown that the unique Nash equilibrium in that auction entails one of the
venture capitalists acquiring a good innovation at a price S
1 = vj (g) if vj (g) > vij > vii;
that no one acquires a bad innovation if vj (g) > vij > vii; that one of the incumbents
acquires the early stage innovation at a price S
1 = vj (g) if vij > vj (g) > vii; and that
one of the incumbents acquires the early stage innovation at a price S
1 = vii if vij >
vii > vj (g). The intuition for the fact that there is no one acquiring the bad innovation
for  < PA is the following: Venture capitalists only bid a positive amount for good
early stage innovations, and this bid is higher than the expected value of the innovation
to the incumbents. Thus, in this interval, incumbents are not able to appropriate good
innovations. However, if they were to bid anything positive, they would appropriate the
innovation if it is bad. Therefore, they maximize their expected payo by bidding zero.
We can express this result as in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 1. For  < PA (a) a good innovation will be developed by a venture-
backed rm, where the venture capitalist paid a price S
1 = vj (g); and (b) a bad
innovation will not be acquired by either incumbents or venture capitalists.
2. For PA <  < ii (a) a good innovation will be preemptively acquired and developed
by an incumbent that paid a price S
1 = vj (g); and (b) a bad innovation will be
24preemptively acquired but not developed by an incumbent that paid a price S
1 =
vj (g);
3. For ii <  (a) a good innovation will be preemptively acquired and developed by an
incumbent that paid a price S
1 = vii; and (b) a bad innovation will be preemptively
acquired but not developed by an incumbent that paid a price S
1 = vii.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Depending on the extent of the venture capitalists' information advantage and their
ability to signal which, in turn, depends on the cost dierence for developing good and bad
innovations, the early stage innovation is either acquired by an incumbent that invests
k
A and pays S
1 = vj (g) or S
1 = vii or by a venture capitalist that invests k
j (g) and pays
S
1 = vj (g). This leads to the following corollaries.
Corollary 1 As long as  is suciently high, incumbents acquire early stage innova-
tions to preempt, for them, excessive investments in development that would otherwise
be undertaken by a venture-backed rm. The threshold level of , for which preemptive
acquisitions occur, PA, is smaller the less costly it is for a venture-backed rm to mimic
the development of a good innovation when it is bad.
Our results predict when we should expect a vigorous development of good inno-
vations. This is the case whenever venture capitalists are in a position to develop the
innovation. Consider panels (i) of gures 4, 5, and 6. If it is unlikely for an early stage
innovation to be good and thus lead to a successfully commercialized innovation after
its development, i.e., if  < PA, we observe vigorous development by venture-backed
rms. In addition, once we compare the three gures, we can see that the less costly it
is for a venture-backed rm to mimic the development of a good idea when it is bad, the
more extensively venture-backed rms owning a good innovation will have to develop it
in order to signal its good nature.
Corollary 2 (1) Investment in the development of good innovations is vigorous for low
 as innovations will then be developed by a venture-backed rm. (2) Investment in the
development of good innovations by venture-backed rms is the more vigorous, the cheaper
it is for a venture-backed rm possessing a bad innovation to mimic one possessing a good
innovation.
254.2 Incentives for early stage innovation
Our results have striking consequences for entrepreneurial incentives to create early stage
innovations in the rst place. If there were no venture capitalists, entrepreneurs could
only turn to incumbents for the development of their early stage innovations. In this
case, the incumbents' valuation and winning bid for early stage innovations is, as we
have shown, vii. As demonstrated in proposition 3, if entrepreneurs could also turn to
venture capitalists, the winning bid might be higher, even in cases where incumbents
develop the innovation. These consequences are outlined in this subsection.
If  < PA, the good innovation will be developed by a venture-backed rm. Venture
capitalists bid vj (g) in case the innovation is good and zero in case it is bad, while
incumbents always bid zero. Consequently, the entrepreneur has a payo of vj (g) if and
only if the early stage innovation turns out to be good and zero otherwise. This leaves
him with an expected payo for the early stage innovation of vj (g), which we have
shown to be greater than vii.
If PA <  < ii, the early stage innovation will be preemptively acquired by an
incumbent, which develops it in case it turns out to be good. The incumbent bids
vj (g), which we have also shown to be greater than vii, and the expected payo for the
entrepreneur is vj (g).
If ii < , once more, the early stage innovation will be preemptively acquired by
an incumbent, which develops it in case it turns out to be good. The incumbents bid
vii and the entrepreneur has exactly the same expected payo in the presence of venture
capitalists as it has in their absence.
Therefore, as long as  < ii, the existence of venture capitalists { whether or not they
get to develop the innovations { increases the expected payo from early stage innovations
for the entrepreneurs.
Proposition 4 The existence of venture capitalists increases the incentives for entrepreneurs
to engage in early stage innovation for  < ii and does not change them otherwise.
In other words, the existence of venture capitalists may not only generate a more
vigorous development of existing early stage innovations, which may result in increased
competitiveness in the market, but it may also give higher incentives to entrepreneurs to
produce new innovations in the rst place.
265 Example: Linear-Quadratic Model
In this section, we give an illustration of our results based on a specic type of competition
and specic costs of innovating. We consider a duopolistic market with linear inverse
demand P = a bX, where a > 0 denotes consumers' willingness to pay and b > 0 denotes
market size21, P is the price of the product, in which ex-ante symmetric incumbents with
unit production costs, c, compete  a la Cournot. The strategic variable in the product-
market interaction (stage 4), xi, is the quantity chosen by each rm i, where X =
PNI
i=1 xi
is equal to the total industry production. We assume that the development of a good
innovation will lead to a unit production cost reduction of k 2 ]0;c[ units, whereas that
of a bad one does not reduce costs, regardless of the level of k. Satisfying assumption
1, the cost of development for a venture-backed rm is assumed to be Cj (kj) =
k2
2 ,




For the specic assumptions taken in this section, standard Cournot analysis results
in x
A (kjg) = a c+2k
3b , x
N (kjg) = a c k









2 for a good developed innovation and in x
A (kjb) = x
N (kjb) = a c
3b , and




2 for a bad innovation. That these reduced-form product-
market prots fulll assumption 2 is easily veriable.
Remember that an acquiring incumbent can verify the nature of the innovation after
having obtained it and before investing in it. Thus, its optimal investment in the devel-
opment of a good innovation can be shown to equal k
i (g) =
4(a c)
9bg 8. Similarly, a venture-
backed rm's optimal investment in the development of a good innovation, if it is uncon-








The venture-backed rm's prot from auctioning o the good developed innovation













the constrained one. The problem is unconstrained as long as ku
j (g) fullls the venture-













6bg 2. It can be veried that vc
j (g) = vu
j (g) if and only if 1
bb = 3
6bg 2 and
21The higher b, the smaller the market.
27vc
j (g) < vu
j (g) otherwise.
The value for an incumbent rm of acquiring the early stage innovation, when it would
otherwise be obtained by a rival incumbent, equals vii = 
16(a c)2(bg 1)
b(9bg 8)2 . The value for
an incumbent rm of obtaining the innovation when it would otherwise be obtained,





















for the constrained case.
Dene g = 1
bg as the relative return to development of a good project and b = 1
bb as
that of a bad project. A high b is equivalent to a small market size and a high  to a high
cost of development. Therefore, the higher is  = 1
b, the higher is the relative return
to development and the more worthwhile is the extra investment in the development of
the innovation. Using this transformation, we can represent the equilibrium organization
for each  in an g   b graph. We show three of these graphs (for  = 0:3,  = 0:6, and
 = 0:9) for a good innovation in gure 7. As g > b by assumption, given g < b, the
only region that is economically sensible for our analysis is the one below the diagonal.
Note that the closer is a point to the diagonal, the more similar are the costs of developing
good and bad innovations.
Our example shows the patterns of the model: Close to the diagonal, where the
development costs of good and bad innovations are similar, a venture-backed rm would
have to choose a very high investment level in order to signal a good innovation. This
would increase its sale price in a late acquisition, and would therefore be more likely
to trigger a preemptive acquisition. Furthermore, the higher is , the more preemptive
acquisitions will occur.
6 Discussion of Assumptions
Will our main ndings also hold when we relax some of the assumptions made in the
above analysis? In the remaining paragraphs of the paper we discuss (i) the possibility
for a venture-backed rm to use not only a productive signal but also a non-productive
signal; (ii) the eects of allowing for the exit of a venture-backed rm by an initial public
oering; and (iii) some equilibrium selection issues.
(i) Productive versus non-productive signals In our analysis, we have assumed
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Figure 7: Equilibrium Ownership in the Linear-Quadratic Model; g and b are the
relative return to development of good and bad basic innovations, respectively, with
g = 1=gb and b = 1=bb.
29cally used in initial public oerings (IPOs), including capital structure and underpricing
of stocks when selling directly to an incumbent, but rather that the signaling occurs
through investment in technology. Indeed, there is evidence that rms in high-tech in-
dustries use technology proxies such as the number of R&D personnel to signal the value
of their rms to investors.22 There are also studies showing a linkage between R&D
spending and investors' expectations regarding the future value of rms. See for instance
[9] Chan, Martin and Kessinger (1990), who nd that high-technology rms experience
higher abnormal returns than low technology rms when announcements of increased
R&D spending are made, and [13] Doukas and Switzer (1992), who nd that rms in
high concentration industries experience positive abnormal returns when announcements
in R&D are made.
If we allowed for both types of signals, productive and non-productive, then prior to
its choice of development, the venture-backed rm would have to consider which signal
is more protable to use. If it is more protable to use non-productive signals, it will
use them and set the investment level equal to the case when no information problem
exists. If the cost of signaling or verifying that an innovation is good is the same for the
productive and non-productive signals, the venture-backed rm will choose the productive
signal. The reason for this choice is twofold: (1) the productive signal will increase the
reward (sale price or entry prot) due to the signaling eect; and (2) due to the direct
product-market prot eect. On the other hand, non-productive signals only increase the
reward due to the signaling eect alone. More generally, the choice between a productive
and non-productive signal will depend on what strategies are available and the underlying
cost and demand parameters. This choice thus needs to be determined within a specic
model. A study of this issue is left to future research.
(ii) Initial public oerings (IPOs) A large part of the existing literature on venture
capital concentrates on venture-backed rms that exit by IPOs, whereas we study exit by
sale to incumbents. If we allowed both types of exits, i.e., IPOs and sale to incumbents,
then the venture-backed rm must, prior to its choice of development (signaling), consider
under which conditions it is more protable to exit, either by IPO or by selling to an
incumbent.
22See [36] Megginson, Wang, and Chua (2001).
30Empirically, [17] Gans et al. (2002) and [20] Gans and Stern (2003) show that rms
are more likely to act as suppliers of technology to incumbent rms in an M&A when
intellectual property rights are secure, investment costs are high and brokers to facil-
itate the trade are available. When the opposite applies, start-ups are more likely to
commercialize their innovations through entry in an IPO. Furthermore, U.S. data from
VentureOne show that, in the last decade, exits through M&As generated consistently
higher aggregate value than exits through IPOs despite the fact that the frequency of
M&As is similar to that of IPOs. This indicates that M&As are an empirically important
exit mode. A comprehensive theoretical study of this issue, however, is beyond the scope
of this paper and left to future research. Our model may serve as a basis for such a study.
(iii) Equilibrium selection Signaling games often have multiple equilibria. We have
chosen to solve our model for the ecient separating equilibrium in which either the un-
constrained prot-maximizing investment, ku
j (g), or the minimum necessary investment
to signal, kc
j (g), is chosen.
However, there also exist pooling equilibria in which venture capitalists choose equal
levels of investment in the development of good and bad innovations. In this case, in-
cumbents would not learn the type of the innovation and could bid in stage 3 using
only in expectations. Similarly to in the separating equilibrium, in the pooling equi-
librium venture-backed rms choose the amount of development in order to maximize
the expected dierence between the prot of an acquiring and a non-acquiring incum-
bent. This would increase the sale price an acquirer would have to pay and decrease
the prot of non-acquirers as they would face an aggressive rival in the marketplace. In
the separating equilibrium, there was an o-setting eect from the transmission of the
venture capitalist's superior information to the potential acquirer; with the consequence
that incumbents did not prefer to preemptively acquire the early stage innovation if the
information advantage of the venture capitalist was suciently large. This eect does
not exist in a pooling equilibrium and, therefore, incumbents would always acquire pre-
emptively if venture-backed rms were to choose equal investments in the development of
good and bad innovations. For this reason we chose not to characterize this equilibrium
and instead to concentrate on the more interesting case of the separating equilibrium.
317 Concluding remarks
In this study we have shown that when venture capitalists are specialized in selecting
promising early stage innovations they have an incentive to use high investments in the
development of an innovation to signal its good nature prior to their exit by selling the
innovation to an incumbent. However, we have also shown that incumbents can undertake
early preemptive acquisitions to prevent such signaling-driven high investment, despite
the risk of buying a bad idea. Consequently, to exist in equilibrium, venture capitalists
must be suciently more ecient in selecting projects; otherwise preemptive acquisitions
by incumbents will take place.
More generally, the paper has shown that the emergence of venture capitalists whose
specialty is scrutinizing business plans will not only help the market select projects, but
may also create a more vigorous development of innovations in the market and higher
rewards for entrepreneurs who nd new innovations due to the signaling eect.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Denote the equilibrium investment level in a bad project in a separating equilib-
rium by k
j (b) and that in a good innovation by k
j (g). In any perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium, beliefs about the equilibrium path must be correctly derived from the equilibrium
strategies using Bayes' rule. This implies that observing k
j (g), rms must assign a prob-
ability one to the project being good and observing k
j (b), rms must assign a probability
one to the project being bad.




= 0, the resulting valua-
tion after observing k
j (b) is w(kjb) = RA (kjb) RN (kjb) = 0. The resulting maximum
(and winning) bid is then S3 = 0.
Assume now that incumbents observe k
j (g). Denote by bi incumbent i's bid and
by b 2 RNI the vector of these bids. First, consider the equilibrium candidate where
incumbent  2 I acquires the innovation, denoted by a vector b: Note that b
 > w " is
a weakly dominated strategy, since no owner will post a bid over its maximum valuation
to obtain the innovation. If b
 < w   "; rm 0 benets from deviating to b
0 = b
 + ";
since it then obtains the innovation and pays a price lower than its valuation for obtaining
it. Last, consider candidate b
 = w   "; b
0 = w   2". No owner then has an incentive
to deviate: This is therefore a Nash equilibrium and the only NE where rm  obtains
the assets. Second, note that the situation where no incumbent obtains the innovation
cannot occur if there is no reservation price at the auction.
B Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Suppose that when the project is bad, the venture-backed rm chooses some
strictly positive equilibrium investment level k0
j > 0. According to Lemma 1, it receives
36a payment equal to zero, which it could receive if it chose kj = 0. Since choosing kj = 0
saved it the cost of development, the venture-backed rm would be strictly better o by
doing so, which contradicts that k0
j is its equilibrium investment level.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. First note that bidding competition among the symmetric venture capitalists
implies that the equilibrium price cannot be lower than vj. Moreover, note that no
venture capitalist has an incentive to bid higher.
Assume that  < PA. According to Lemma 6, in this case, vij < vj, so that no
incumbent would outbid the venture capitalist. In fact, given that in this case a venture
capitalist wins if the innovation is good and all venture capitalists bid zero if it is bad,
incumbents always bid zero as long as  < PA. This shows part 1.
Assume that PA <  < ii. According to Lemma 5 and 6, vii < vj < vij. Let us now
consider the equilibrium candidate where one incumbent bids vj and the second highest
bid is by a venture capitalist that bids vj  ". Note that the acquiring incumbent will not
deviate to a lower bid since it benets in expectation from an acquisition at S1 = vj by
avoiding the excessive investments by venture capitalists, which would otherwise occur in
case the innovation turns out to be good. This follows from the acquiring incumbent's net
prot being 
A = (RA (k
i (g))   C (k










by Lemma 6. Clearly, deviating to a higher bid is not protable for the winning incum-
bent. Moreover, other incumbents will not challenge an acquisition by a rival rm since
they benet from weaker market competition, while not bearing the cost of the acquisi-
tion. This follows from the fact that RN (k
i (g)) = (RA (k
i (g))   C (k
i (g)))   vii >
(RA (k
i (g))   C (k
i (g)))   vj = 
A holds by Lemma 6. This shows part 2.
Assume ii < . According to Lemma 5 and 6, vj < vii < vij. In this case, bidding
competition among the symmetric incumbents implies that the equilibrium price cannot
be lower than S1 = vii. Moreover, note that no incumbent has an incentive to bid higher.
This shows part 3.
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